One Period, Two Anchors Two federal agencies state the rule in one sentence each. From Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, "How long does information stay on my credit report?" : "A credit reporting company generally can report most negative information for seven years." From Federal Trade Commission, "Fixing Your Credit FAQs" : "Most negative information will stay on your report for seven years, and bankruptcy information will stay on for 10 years." Neither sentence says seven years from what, and the CFPB page names no starting date at all. A charged-off account carries three dates that could serve: the month the borrower first fell behind, the day the lender wrote the balance off, and the day a collector took the file. Those can sit six months apart. The statute picks none of them. It starts the clock 180 days after the first one. What the Statute Anchors To Section 605 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, at 15 U.S.C. 1681c, lists what...
One Period, Two Anchors
Two federal agencies state the rule in one sentence each. From Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, "How long does information stay on my credit report?": "A credit reporting company generally can report most negative information for seven years." From Federal Trade Commission, "Fixing Your Credit FAQs": "Most negative information will stay on your report for seven years, and bankruptcy information will stay on for 10 years."
Neither sentence says seven years from what, and the CFPB page names no starting date at all. A charged-off account carries three dates that could serve: the month the borrower first fell behind, the day the lender wrote the balance off, and the day a collector took the file. Those can sit six months apart. The statute picks none of them. It starts the clock 180 days after the first one.
What the Statute Anchors To
Section 605 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, at 15 U.S.C. 1681c, lists what a consumer reporting agency may not report. Paragraph (a)(4) is the collection line: "Accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and loss which antedate the report by more than seven years." Read alone it invites the charge-off reading, because the charge-off is the event it names.
Subsection (c) takes that reading away. In U.S. Government Publishing Office, United States Code, 15 U.S.C. 1681c, paragraph (c)(1) reads:
"The 7-year period referred to in paragraphs (4) and (6) of subsection (a) shall begin, with respect to any delinquent account that is placed for collection (internally or by referral to a third party, whichever is earlier), charged to profit and loss, or subjected to any similar action, upon the expiration of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the commencement of the delinquency which immediately preceded the collection activity, charge to profit and loss, or similar action."
Three things in that sentence do the work. The clock begins "upon the expiration of the 180-day period," so the item's reportable life is seven years and 180 days measured from the delinquency. It begins from "the date of the commencement of the delinquency," the missed payment that opened the run of delinquency ending in the collection or charge-off, which is the first missed payment only where the account was never brought current in between; the counts in this article assume that case. And the collection or charge-off is not an anchor at all; it is only the trigger identifying which delinquency to measure from, the one "which immediately preceded" it.
The parenthetical deserves a second read: "placed for collection (internally or by referral to a third party, whichever is earlier)" means an in-house recovery unit counts, and that where a file is worked internally before it is referred out, the earlier of those two dates is the trigger.
Subsection (c)(2) then limits the mechanism to "items of information added to the file of a consumer on or after the date that is 455 days after September 30, 1996," which is December 29, 1997. A dead letter for live accounts, but it shows the drafters counting in days, not months.
Who Supplies the Start Date
The statute does not leave the start date to the agency to reconstruct. Section 623, at 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(a)(5)(A), puts the duty on the furnisher and sets the deadline. From U.S. Government Publishing Office, United States Code, 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2: "A person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a delinquent account being placed for collection, charged to profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action shall, not later than 90 days after furnishing the information, notify the agency of the date of delinquency on the account, which shall be the month and year of the commencement of the delinquency on the account that immediately preceded the action."
Note the granularity mismatch. Subsection 1681c(c)(1) counts 180 days from "the date of the commencement of the delinquency," a day. What the furnisher reports is "the month and year." The field that starts a day-counted clock carries no day, and neither section supplies the missing one, so a delinquency reported as March 2019 has to be assigned a day before 180 can be counted from it. The count below assumes March 1.
The rule of construction in 1681s-2(a)(5)(B) is where the subparagraphs turn the meaning. It opens: "For purposes of this paragraph only, and provided that the consumer does not dispute the information". Clauses (i) and (ii) cover the ordinary cases: repeating the date the original creditor already reported, or, on a first report, establishing and following "reasonable procedures to obtain the date of delinquency from the creditor or another reliable source" and reporting "that date to a consumer reporting agency as the date of delinquency". Clause (iii) is the loose one: where the date "cannot be reasonably obtained as provided in clause (ii)," the furnisher complies by following procedures "to ensure the date reported as the date of delinquency precedes the date on which the account is placed for collection, charged to profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action, and reports such date to the credit reporting agency". A date that merely precedes the collection action can be later than the truth, and a later date pushes removal outward. Two limits sit on that safe harbor: it exists "for purposes of this paragraph only," and it holds only while the consumer does not dispute. A dispute withdraws it.
The furnisher rules add a guard. In eCFR, Appendix E to 12 CFR Part 1022, Interagency Guidelines Concerning the Accuracy and Integrity of Information Furnished to Consumer Reporting Agencies, section III(g) tells a furnisher to handle transfers "in a manner that prevents re-aging of information, duplicative reporting, or other problems that may similarly affect the accuracy or integrity of the information furnished." Re-aging is what the 180-day rule blocks: a resold debt arriving with a fresh date and a restarted clock.
Why the Charge-Off Date Looks Correct
The charge-off reading survives because on one very common product it is right. Bank supervisors set charge-off timing in a joint policy at 65 FR 36903, Federal Register, "Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Policy": "Closed-end retail loans that become past due 120 cumulative days and open-end retail loans that become past due 180 cumulative days from the contractual due date should be classified Loss and charged off."
Line the numbers up. The statute starts the seven years 180 days after the delinquency commences. The policy charges off an open-end account, a credit card among them, at 180 cumulative days past due from the same first missed due date. So on a credit card charged off on schedule, seven years from the charge-off and seven years and 180 days from the first missed payment name the same day. The wrong method returns the right date, and nobody notices.
Change products and the agreement collapses. A closed-end installment loan is charged off at 120 cumulative days, 60 days before the statutory clock starts. An account referred to collection at 90 days past due, which the parenthetical in 1681c(c)(1) treats as the trigger, is 90 days early. Anchoring to either drops the item two or three months early. The error runs the other way too: a balance that sits unsold for a year before it is placed for collection has a trigger far past the 180-day mark, and using it keeps the item on the report long after seven years and 180 days have run.
The same notice shows why a trigger date is a poor proxy at the edges: "Fraudulent loans should be classified Loss and charged off no later than 90 days of discovery or within the time frames adopted in this classification policy, whichever is shorter." That date floats free of any delinquency. Only the commencement date holds still.
Counting One Account All the Way Out
Take an installment loan whose first missed payment falls in March 2019, reported with a date of delinquency of March 2019. Count 180 days from March 1: March 31 is day 31, April 30 is day 61, May 31 is day 92, June 30 is day 122, July 31 is day 153, and August 27 is day 180. The 180-day period expires August 27, 2019, the seven years begin there, and they end in late August 2026. From September 2026 the item falls outside 1681c(a)(4).
Apply the wrong anchor to the same loan. Charged off at 120 cumulative days, it was written off at the end of June 2019, and seven years from there is late June 2026, two months early, which no consumer complains about. Now the mirror case: the loan sits unsold until a collector takes it in September 2020. Seven years from that trigger is September 2027, thirteen months past what the Act allows. That is the version that surfaces on a mortgage application.
The gap between an anchor date and a counting rule turns up all over consumer finance law, and it is usually the counting rule that decides the outcome. Provisional credit under Regulation E runs on business days, not calendar days, which turns a ten-day duty into two weeks. An escrow shortage and an escrow deficiency are repaid on different schedules, though both are described as a gap in one account.
The Cross-Reference That Points at the Wrong Paragraph
Read the opening of (c)(1) once more: "The 7-year period referred to in paragraphs (4) and (6) of subsection (a)". Now read (a)(6) as it stands: "The name, address, and telephone number of any medical information furnisher that has notified the agency of its status, unless—", followed by two subparagraphs on coded reporting and insurance recipients. There is no seven-year period in (a)(6) for (c)(1) to modify.
The Editorial Notes on the same GPO page explain it. Congress added the subsection in 1996: "Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104–208, §2406(b), added subsec. (c)." At that point (a)(6) was the catch-all, "any other adverse item of information," so the 180-day start governed both the collection line and the catch-all. Two years later the list was rearranged. Pub. L. 105–347, §5(2)–(4) "redesignated par. (6) as (5), inserted ', other than records of convictions of crimes' after 'of information', and struck out former par. (5)", the paragraph that had covered records of arrest, indictment or conviction of crime. The catch-all became (a)(5), and nobody moved the cross-reference. In 2003, "Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 108–159, §412(b), added par. (6)," dropping the medical furnisher rule into the vacated slot.
The phrase "paragraphs (4) and (6)" is therefore a 1996 address applied to a list renumbered in 1998 and refilled in 2003. On the text as printed, the 180-day start attaches to (a)(4) and nothing else. The catch-all in (a)(5), which covers a thirty-day late payment on an account never charged off or referred anywhere, runs its seven years from the adverse item itself. That is the practical result either way, since such items have no collection trigger.
Where This Doesn't Apply
Subsection 1681c(b) switches the list off for three kinds of report: "The provisions of paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a) are not applicable in the case of any consumer credit report to be used in connection with—", then "(1) a credit transaction involving, or which may reasonably be expected to involve, a principal amount of $150,000 or more;", "(2) the underwriting of life insurance involving, or which may reasonably be expected to involve, a face amount of $150,000 or more; or", "(3) the employment of any individual at an annual salary which equals, or which may reasonably be expected to equal $75,000, or more."
Two details are easy to skip. The trigger is what the transaction "may reasonably be expected to involve," not what is finally advanced, so a declined application can still fall inside. And the 2003 amendment narrowed the switch to "paragraphs (1) through (5)," so paragraphs (6), (7) and (8) keep operating in exempt reports: the medical furnisher restriction and the two veteran medical debt restrictions hold in all three exempt categories, the $150,000 principal amount, the $150,000 life insurance face amount and the $75,000 salary alike.
Neighboring clocks in the same subsection are not seven-year clocks, and the 180-day start does not reach them. Bankruptcies run 10 years under (a)(1). Civil suits, civil judgments and arrest records run under (a)(2) "more than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever is the longer period," so a long limitations period lengthens the window instead of shortening it. Paid tax liens under (a)(3) run "from date of payment," so paying one starts its clock rather than ending it. Convictions of crimes are carved out of (a)(5) by the words "other than records of convictions of crimes," and the 1998 amendment struck the former (a)(5) that had covered records of "arrest, indictment, or conviction of crime," so no paragraph of subsection (a) now states a period for a conviction record. Veteran medical debt splits two ways: (a)(7) excludes an item whose care "antedates the report by less than 1 year," the opposite of an age cutoff, while (a)(8) excludes a "fully paid or settled veteran's medical debt" with no time element at all.
The reporting period is also not a limitations period on the debt. Nothing in 1681c extinguishes an obligation or bars a suit; it governs only what a consumer report may show. Reading a garnishment order means running two caps and taking the smaller one, and none of those caps care what a credit report shows. The FTC page is blunt about the rest: "No one promising to repair your credit can legally remove information if it's both accurate and current."
Numbers to Re-check
The 180 days. Fixed in statute since 1996 and indexed to nothing. It moves only if Congress amends 1681c(c)(1).
The 90-day furnisher duty. Section 1681s-2(a)(5)(A) allows 90 days after furnishing the information to report the date of delinquency. A file pulled inside that window can show a charged-off account with no delinquency date yet.
The 120 and 180 cumulative days. These come from supervisory policy at 65 FR 36903, not from statute. A revision there would move charge-off timing without touching the FCRA, and the accidental agreement on open-end accounts would end.
The $150,000 and $75,000 exemptions. Last changed on September 30, 1996, when Pub. L. 104-208 raised them from $50,000 and $20,000. Section 1681c contains no adjustment or indexing provision, so they erode with inflation until Congress acts.
The re-aging criteria. The same 2000 notice asks that a re-aged account show "a renewed willingness and ability to repay the loan," have "existed for at least nine months," and carry "at least three consecutive minimum monthly payments or the equivalent cumulative amount." Those tests separate a legitimate restart from the re-aging that Appendix E tells furnishers to prevent.
The cross-reference in (c)(1). Still "paragraphs (4) and (6)" in the current Code. Repointing it to (4) and (5) would change little by itself, because (c)(1) operates only "with respect to any delinquent account that is placed for collection (internally or by referral to a third party, whichever is earlier), charged to profit and loss, or subjected to any similar action," and a catch-all item with no such trigger gives the 180 days nothing to attach to.
The procedure is short. Find the date of delinquency field, not the charge-off field or the date the collector opened its own account. Add 180 days. Add seven years. If that date is later than the first missed payment, or if it moved when the debt was sold, that is the figure to dispute, because a dispute also withdraws the safe harbor in 1681s-2(a)(5)(B).
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